But that concern is not reflected in the economic theory of democracy, which implicitly takes as its benchmark a world in which every wish or whim of a majority of voters would be perfectly reflected in the platfonns and actions of politicians. In other words, put somewhat bluntly, democracy ought to mean mob rule of the purest kind. Then, in most of the literature, it is argued that the benchmark, viewed as an ideal, cannot be reached and therefore that the mechanism of democracy is necessarily "imperfect" or "inefficient". For instance, the wishes of the voters are such that a stable majority cannot exist (the cycling problem). Or politicians exploit voters' rational ignorance to further their own interests and those of the pressure groups they transact with (politicians "cheat" or "shirk"). The possibility that politicians might follow too closely the policy preferences of a majority of the electorate is not considered. In a recent article, Donald Wittman (1989) argues that democracy is efficient, but, his aim being only to show that a stable majority obtains and that politicians act according to its preferences -the presence of politicians introducing no significant distance or distortionhis message comes down, put somewhat bluntly again, to saying that the pessimists are wrong because, in the real world, thanks heavens, the mob does rule.
Let me fonnulate three disclaimers. First, when referring to mob rule I do not want to suggest that any distinction should be made between "masses" and "elites". There is ample evidence that the views expressed 14 by "elites" (whoever they are) on most issues and particularly on the really important ones cannot be singled out for superior quality (whatever that means). Second, I do not deny the relevance of citizen preferences (in some sense to be considered below), and the need, for a political system to deserve being called democratic, that they be reflected (in some way) in actual or proposed policy-making. Third, contrary to Wittman, I think that "shirking" by politicians can be the source of an important "failure" of representative democracy. Under uncertainty and information costs and asymmetry, agents such as politicians (or doctors) have considerable discretion. That there will be some misuse (from the point of view of principals) of that discretion is unavoidable and potentially a very serious problem? But the fact that discretion has a cost (the possibility of cheating) does not imply that we should always deplore its existence.
3 In other words there are two sides to discretion. I am concerned here with the second one, without attempting to relate it to the first. Why discretion may be a condition for democracy to work is not a question that the economic theory of democracy, particularly the spatial theory of elections, can address. But that means that it loses touch with a part of reality which almost everybody else considers as essential.
The politicians we have in mind are not concerned with becoming members of assemblies. They run in popular elections for functions such as President of the United States, France or Peru, Prime Minister of Britain or Ontario, Chancellor of Germany, Mayor of New York City, Athens (Greece) or Dijon (France), Governor of California. Focussing on this kind of actors and elections does not mean that others are less significant. For instance political parties are clearly essential in some countries, such as Italy, and important everywhere. But taking them into account would complicate matters too much. The aspect of politics we concentrate on is one among others. It is enough that it is not unimportant.
Section 1 discusses voters' preferences over policies. The main argument there is that voters know that their policy preferences are tentative and wish them to be interpreted as such by politicians. In other words, the voter-politician relation is in some respects analogous to the patient-doctor one. 4 The second section considers the objectives of politicians. That these objectives do not always consist exclusively in maximizing popularity in the short run or winning the next election is increasingly acknowledged, but I remain unconvinced by the currently dominant alternative which consists in endowing politicians with policy
